Georgia 'under attack' as Russian tanks roll in

[tigershark]

Georgia Strikes Back With Air Defenses

Aug 11, 2008
By David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie 
 

If the land war in Georgia so far seems to be going decidedly in favor of the Russian army and navy, the Georgians seem to be racking up a lopsided score with their air defenses.

Over the weekend, the Russians made a successful advance on land through South Ossetia to the outskirts of the Georgian east-west transportation hub of Gori. There also was a one-sided naval battle - that resulted in the sinking of a Georgian gunboat - in the Black Sea off the coast of the second breakaway enclave of Abkhazia.

However, Georgian air defenses appear to be taking a steady toll on Russian aircraft. Russia has admitted to losing a total of four aircraft (the Georgians claim 10) in the conflict. So far they've admitted to the destruction of three Su-25 Frogfoot strike aircraft and a Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber that was flying a reconnaissance mission.

Photos from the combat area show the wreck of the Tu-22 and a Frogfoot as well as a picture of the Backfire pilot in a Georgian hospital. The pilot was Col. Igor Zinov, a 50 year-old Tu-22M3 instructor pilot stationed at the Russian Flight Test Center at Akhtubinsk. (See Aviation Week's defense photo gallery for photos.)

"Ergo, the Russians are using their A-Team, as expected," a U.S. analyst says.

Other analysts say the Georgians are probably operating the SA-11 Buk-M1 (low-to-high altitude) and the (low-to-medium altitude) Tor-1M mobile air defense missile systems.

"The Russians have gone to great lengths to try and implicate the Ukraine in the Russian Air Force losses, even going as far as to suggest that an SA-5 sold to the Georgians by the Ukraine was responsible for the Backfire loss," a second U.S. analyst says. "That's clearly not the case, but shows the Russian attempt to bring the Ukraine into the periphery of this event by implication, and to attempt to explain how one of their premier long-range attack assets could have been shot down so easily.

"The Russian press has been making lots of noise about the BUK and TOR systems, and I would say that the BUK is the most likely culprit for all of these aircraft losses," the analyst says. "If so, it points out a major flaw in the Russian plan - not gaining [and] maintaining pure air superiority [and] dominance over the battlespace by taking out the Georgian air defenses and air defense network before they went into the conflict."

Russian-built and designed air defenses are apparently exploitable, as was shown in the Israeli Air Force's total shut down of Syrian air defenses prior to bombing a suspected nuclear site. But Russia apparently has yet to apply the digital keys to unlock the Georgians' network.

During the months before the conflict, the Russians claimed to have shot down several Hermes 450 UAVs (made by Israeli-based Elbit) with fighter aircraft stationed at least temporarily in South Ossetia.

The Russians say they shot down a Georgian Frogfoot outside the town of Eredvi in South Ossetia today. The Russians - in a stunning piece of irony - have twice bombed the Su-25 Frogfoot manufacturing plant on the outskirts of the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.

So if the Georgians over-estimated their ground forces, "it appears that the Russians underestimated the Georgian air defense abilities in this conflict, and have paid the price," the second U.S. analyst says.

Georgia's foreign minister, Eka Tkeshelashvili, and deputy interior minister, Eka Zguladze, will be in Brussels tomorrow for emergency talks at NATO headquarters. The two officials will meet with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and address the North Atlantic Council.

Photo shows crashed Su-25 Frogfoot strike aircraft canopy. Both sides are claiming to have shot down this aircraft in recent hostilities between Russia and Georgia. Image from Georgian television.
 
 
Source

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/AIR08118.xml&headline=Georgia%20Strikes%20Back%20With%20Air%20Defenses&channel=defense
 
 
 

[tigershark]

U.S. Ponders Georgian Air Defenses

Aug 13, 2008

David A. Fulghum

U.S. analysts are beginning to address the question of why the Israeli Air Force was able to penetrate Syria’s Russian-made air defenses, while the Russian Air Force was not able to finesse Georgia’s Russian-made air defenses.

That Russian-built and designed air defenses are exploitable was shown in the Israeli Air Force’s total shutdown of Syrian air defenses prior to bombing a suspected nuclear site last year (Aerospace DAILY, May 2). But Russia apparently didn’t have or didn’t use the digital keys to unlock the Georgians’ network.

There are indications from U.S. analysts that the relative simplicity – meaning far less networking – of the Georgian air defenses made it tougher to knock out the system all at once.

Nevertheless, theories abound about the apparent effectiveness of Georgia’s air defense (Aerospace DAILY, Aug. 12) that run from incompetence on the part of the Russians to links to Israel’s sophisticated electronics companies and their aggressive military export goals.

During the months before the conflict, the Russians claimed to have shot down several Hermes 450 drones (supplied by Israeli-based Elbit) with fighter aircraft stationed, at least temporarily, in South Ossetia. Israeli companies also supported Georgia’s Su-25 modernization program. The same companies – Israel Aerospace Industries and Elbit – are renowned for their radar, electronic warfare and electronic attack capabilities.

Wartime operating frequencies for the comparatively formidable SA-11/Buk-1M and Tor-M1 can be changed, thus making them hard for Russian electronic warfare systems to defeat, U.S. aerospace industry specialists note.

Simplicity

Another reason why the Russians would have difficulty affecting the whole Georgian air defense system lies in its simplicity, according to a senior U.S. Air Force officer with combat flying experience in two wars and long experience in the stealth community.

“The Georgian air defense system is much less networked than that of the Syrians and [therefore relies on] autonomous sector operations,” he says. So there’s no way for tactical electronic warfare systems to create massive blind spots.

A Washington-based analyst also pointed to the fog of war and the likelihood of fratricide of Russian aircraft by Russian surface-to-air missiles.

“I think it’s probably something much more simple [that also was at work],” he says. “If you look at some of the videos of Russian equipment pouring into the conflict zone, you’ll note a couple SA-11 surface-to-air missile systems included. Quite possibly, it could be a case of the [Russian] air defenses not realizing the aircraft were Russian systems or something silly like that. Or, it could be simply that they just didn’t factor [friendly aircraft] into the mission planning like they should have.”

In a similar situation during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. air defenses shot down both British and U.S. aircraft.

SA-11 photo: Finnish Defense Forces

Source
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/GEORGIA081308.xml&headline=U.S.%20Ponders%20Georgian%20Air%20Defenses

[Cobra2]

Awesome news Nonpilot. Keep it up buddy. 

[tigershark]

Thanks Cobra I must of missed your reply (smile face & thumbs up)